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Super power competition, the arms race, division and conflict between different
socio-economic systems determine our understanding of East-West relations dur-
ing the Cold War era. The US-led high technology embargo, CoCom, which con-
trolled all technology transfers that might have had strategic importance be-
tween the West and the Soviet Union, dominated the state of affairs in the
field of technology and trade. In this context, the attempt by the Soviet Union
to modernize¹ seemed impossible. In spite of the hindrances created by the
East-West division, the Soviet Union managed to create a system of technology
transfers with Western European states that was functional, even during the
coldest phases of the Cold War era. Through the system of scientific-technical co-
operation (STC), the Soviet Union was able to establish official and inter-govern-
mental connections with Western European states, which created a vivid sphere
of East-West interaction in Europe.² In spite of the East-West divide, the Soviet
Union was an attractive trade partner, which helped to cooperate through the
STC with West European states during the Cold War decades.³
The Soviet STC with the Western European states was possible because it
took place “behind the scenes” that made the Soviet STC, in spite of the ideolog-
ical-political differences, functional and active from the mid-1950s until the end
of the Cold War. The STC is an interesting case study because it was launched
with a clear purpose to solve the problem of technology and related knowledge
in the situation when technological modernization was an imperative for the So-
 The author’s research has focused on the technological modernization in the Finnish Centre
of Excellence in Russian Studies “Choices of Russian Modernisation” coordinated by the Alek-
santeri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland.
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, “The Cold War from New Perspective,” in Reassess-
ing Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),
1– 15.
 By the end of the 1970s, there were agreements with, among others, West Germany, France,
Italy, Japan, the UK, Austria, and Finland. M. Maksimova, “Economic Relations between the So-
cialist and the Capitalist Countries,” in Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations, ed. K. Möttölä, O.N.
Bykov and I.S. Korolev. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 23.
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viet Union. The STC – and the East-West interaction based upon it – has been
missing from the Cold War historiography that has focused almost solely on
the macro level developments. The Soviet STC was practical cooperation on
micro level and remained thus nearly invisible at the level of superpower poli-
tics. In order to make the Soviet STC visible, the focus has been placed on
case studies. Neutral Finland, the first STC partner of the Soviet Union, offers
a good case study to investigate the STC cooperation in practice. During the
Cold War, Finland became one of the major mediators of Western technology
and related knowledge with the Soviet Union. State regulation and planning,⁴
which were closely connected to the system of the Finnish-Soviet trade and
the Soviet-Finnish STC, supported the process of mediation. This chapter aims
to analyze what kinds of processes of technology and knowledge transfers
took place between Finland and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What
kinds of Western technologies were transferred, and how were the transfers dis-
seminated into the Soviet system? The following is based on materials collected
in Russian and Finnish archives, on contemporary studies, research literature,
and the author’s prior publications.
The Soviet technological modernization and the
system of STC
The Soviet scientific-technological cooperation (STC), launched in mid-1950s was
connected to the technological modernization of the Soviet economy project,
which was based on the acquisition of foreign technology and related knowhow.
As a leader of the new superpower, Nikita Khrushchev (1956– 1964) followed the
model adapted by Peter the Great and the strategy that had been determining
factor in the modernization project by Lenin and Stalin, that is, to borrow ad-
vanced Western technology in order to move quickly forward. Khrushchev’s suc-
cessor Leonid Brezhnev (1964– 1982) continued on the same path in order to
maintain the Soviet superpower status amid hardening East-West competition.
The technological modernization was needed to strengthen the resilience of
the Soviet economy and to transform extensive economic growth into intensive
one. The Soviet Union had to compete with the United States as an equal com-
 In this chapter, planning is understood through the system of mixed economy in Finland and
Finnish-Soviet clearing trade, i.e. the balanced flows of goods that were fixed to match with the
Soviet five-year plans. The five-year planning horizon proved to be beneficial for the research
and development (R&D) activities of the Finnish enterprises.
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panion in order to prove the superiority of the socialist system and to be a credi-
ble leader for the socialist bloc.⁵ Being far from autarky, the Soviet Union had to
seek interaction with Western states.⁶ The adopted modernization plan was
based on serious planning, and on taking advantage of the existing connections
with Western states in Europe with the aim to “catch up.”
The key objective for the Soviet STC “to faster exploit the achievements of
science and technology and the new methods of production”⁷ set the goals,
and illustrates well the Soviet aims in its cooperation with the West. The main
actor in the Soviet STC was the State Committee of Science and Technology
(GKNT),⁸ which organized and coordinated all technology and know-how trans-
fer and mediated information, propagated new practices, and took care of the
diffusion of new technologies and related knowledge in the Soviet Union.⁹ The
STC created a system of reciprocal and bidirectional transfers of technology
and related knowledge between the partners.
The Soviet technological modernization project was an extraordinary en-
deavor. The Soviet military-industrial complex was capable of creating the com-
petitive high technology of which the successful space program was a good ex-
ample. Technology transfers from abroad were needed because there were hardly
any ties between the high-prioritized military sector and civilian industry, which
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), 19; P. Gregory and R. Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet Economic Structure and Performance,
5th edition, (New York: Harper-Collins, 1994), 8; See also Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the
Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), 62; Sari
Autio-Sarasmo, “Soviet Economic Modernisation and Transferring the Technologies from the
West,” in Modernisation in Russia since 1900, ed. Markku Kangaspuro and Jeremy Smith (Helsin-
ki: Finnish Literary Society [Studia Fennica Historica], 2006), 104– 123.
 Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization. The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from
Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 M. Kaje and O. Niitamo, “Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between a Small Capitalist
Country and big Socialist Country,” in Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations, ed. K. Möttölä, O. N.
Bykov and I.S. Korolev. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 143– 144.
 The establishment of GKNT was an outcome of a chain of reorganizations during 1957– 1965.
The idea of the state committee remained much the same, in spite of different names. The final
name Gosudarstvennyi komitet po nauki i tekhnologii SSSR (GKNT) was the final result and exist-
ed between 1965– 1991. Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) fond 9480, opis’ 2. The
GKNT was part of the wider structure of collection of information in the Soviet Union together
with KGB and military intelligence GRU that were in charge of the illegal transfer of technology.
 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), fond 5, opis’ 40, delo 52, list 1–6;
RGANI fond 5, opis’. 40, delo 52, list 13– 19; RGANI fond 5, opis’ 40, delo 121, list 29–30.
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was not able to benefit from the innovations in the military-industrial complex.¹⁰
In order to enhance the resilience of the economy, the Soviet leadership adopted
the Western post-World War Two model of economic growth. The model was
based on the transformation of extensive economic growth on an intensive
one with the help of developed technology, especially automation. Due to the rel-
atively low level of technological knowhow in the socialist bloc, the Soviet Union
needed foreign technology in order to keep up with extremely fast technological
development.¹¹ Transfer of technology through the system of the STC was a sol-
ution for that problem.
In this context, the major benefit was that the Soviet STC was based on in-
tergovernmental agreements and thus an official way to transfer Western tech-
nology and technology-related knowledge to facilitate the Soviet modernization
project. Through the system of the STC, the Soviet Union was not only able to
gain technology but also knowledge and expertize connected with the technol-
ogy that was needed to facilitate technological development and to boost domes-
tic innovations in the Soviet Union. In spite of the CoCom, there were ways to
obtain the desired technology through illegal trade and spying.¹² These chan-
nels, however, did not further the modernization project of the Soviet Union.
In order to profit from the transferred technology, it needed knowledge to use,
 The Soviet military-industrial complex, the prioritized nine ministries, devyatka ‘group of
nine’ in the 1960s and 1970s included ministry of aircraft industry, defence industry, general ma-
chine building industry, medium machine industry, radiotechnology industry, electrotechnical
industry, ship building industry, machine building and communication device industry. In the
1960s, the priority was on rocket technology. N.S. Simonov, VPK SSSR: Tempy ekonomicheskovo
rosta, struktura, organizatsija proizvodstvo, upravlenie [Military-industrial complex SSSR: Tempo
of economic growth, structure, organisation of production and management]. Izdanie 2, (Univer-
sitet Dmitria Pozharskovo, Moskva 2015), 482; Irina B. Bystrova, Sovetskij voenno-promyshlennij
kompleks: problemy stanovlenija i razvitija 1930– 1980 gody [The Soviet military-industrial com-
plex: problems of structuration and development 1930– 1980] (RAN: Institut Rossijskoi Istorii
Moskva, 2006).
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Khrushchev and the challenge of technological progress,” in Khrush-
chev in the Kremlin. Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953– 1964, ed. Jeremy Smith
and Melanie Ilic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),133–143.
 Philip Hanson, “The Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology after Stalin; Some
thoughts on people and connections,” in Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo
and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 28–30; For an overview, see Christopher An-
drew, “Intelligence in the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol II, ed. Melvyn
P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 430; In this
chapter, illegal transfers are not investigated.
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diffuse and refine it.¹³ The STC enabled the transfer of the technology-related
knowledge but it was also a way to establish bilateral cooperation that helped
to maintain and continue the knowledge transfers and the technology trade in
the future.
For the Soviet Union, neutral Finland was an easy choice as the first partner
for the STC. Finland was part of the Russian Empire as an autonomous grand
duchy from 1809. In 1917 Finland became independent and the two states con-
tinued the long tradition of bilateral trade until the “Winter War” broke out in
1939.¹⁴ After the peace treaty in 1945, the Soviet Union demanded Finnish war
reparations to focus on a certain type of technologies, which forced Finland to
develop a machine-building industry. This served the Soviet plan well of turning
Finnish production more in the direction of technology that was desired and
needed in the Soviet Union.¹⁵ The war reparations and the signing of the treaty
of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (FCMA) between Finland and
the Soviet Union in 1948 directed postwar relations and created the basis for
the Finnish-Soviet trade.
Finland became the first market economy country to sign a five-year agree-
ment on the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union; this was for the years
1951– 1955.¹⁶ In 1955, three years after the completion of war reparations, the
FCMA treaty was prolonged and the agreement of the Soviet-Finnish STC was
concluded.¹⁷ The Soviet-Finnish STC agreement was the first treaty between
 Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations (London: Macmillan, 1981),
223; Gary Bertsch, “Technology Transfers and Technology Controls: a Synthesis of the Western-
Soviet Relationship,” in Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development, ed. Ronald
Amann and Julian Cooper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 127– 128; Ian Jackson, The
Economic Cold War. America, Britain and East–West Trade, 1948– 1963 (London: Palgrave, 2001).
 The Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939 and the short war was called the
“Winter War.” After a short period of peace, the conflict started again in 1941 and lasted until
1944. The “Continuation War” was part of World War Two. After the peace in 1945 large areas
of Eastern Finland were annexed to the Soviet Union and Finland had to pay heavy war repar-
ations to the Soviet Union.
 Tatiana Androsova, “Economic interest in Soviet post-war policy in Finland,” in Reassessing
Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 33;
Markku Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma öljy. Neste, Suomi ja kaksi Eurooppaa [Cold War, hot oil. En-
terprise Neste, Finland and the divided Europe] (Helsinki: Werner Söderström Ltd, 1997).
 Juhani Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System: History and Lessons (Hel-
sinki: Bank of Finland Studies A: 94, 1995), 30.
 “Sopimus tieteellis-teknillisestä yhteistoiminnasta Suomen tasavallan ja SNTL:n välillä,
16.8.1955” [Agreement on scientific-technical cooperation between the Republic of Finland
and the Soviet Union], http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1955/19550030 (accessed
15 September 2017).
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any two states with different economic systems to agree upon scientific-technical
cooperation (STC) on a contemporary basis.¹⁸ Since the main targets for the So-
viet STC were the technologically more developed countries in Western Europe,
in the 1950s cooperation with Finland served as a model to establish connections
with the West and rehearse East-West interaction in practice.¹⁹ In spite of the fact
that during the early years of cooperation Finland served as a testing site for the
Soviet cooperation with the West, the STC agreement set the direction of the Fin-
nish-Soviet technology cooperation for years to come.
State regulation and planning:
Finnish-Soviet trade and the STC
The STC was strongly intertwined into the Soviet-Finnish trade. The trade was
based on state regulation and planning through the mixed economy system of
Finland. The Finnish-Soviet trade was based on the bilateral clearing system,
that is, the balanced flows of goods was fixed to match the Soviet administrative
and central management and planning system but in a way that did not hamper
the workings of the Finnish market economy. The clearing arrangements consist-
ed of five-year agreements and annual trade protocols. Each agreement deter-
mined the volume and content of trade for the forthcoming five-year period.
These agreements focused on the exchange of goods and set concrete targets
for trade by containing lists of imports and exports and specifying the value
and volume of delivered goods. The lists were prepared in cooperation with
the Finnish firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations. The prices of individual
deliveries were negotiated and contracted between a supplier and a purchaser.
The positive side of the system was that trade was foreseeable due to the long
 A. Romanov, “Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välisen tieteellis-teknisen yhteistyön tuloksia,” in
Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen tieteellis-tekninen yhteistoiminta 30 vuotta [The results of the
Finnish Soviet scientific-technical cooperation in Soviet-Finnish STC 30 years] (Helsinki,
1985), 8.
 The main target in the West in the 1960s for the Soviet Union was technologically developed
West Germany. RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 9; RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list
39–41; The Soviet-West German trade agreement was concluded in 1958 and cooperation was
widened after the agreement of cultural and scientific-technical cooperation in 1959. Archive
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAN) fond 579, opis’ 13, delo 147, list 1– 15; About the
case of West Germany, see Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain: Soviet Sci-
entific-Technical Cooperation with Finland and West Germany” in Reassessing Cold War Europe,
ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge 2011), 66–82.
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agreements with secure payments. The drawback of the arrangement was that
trade became very bureaucratic.²⁰
The development of Finnish-Soviet trade presents a good picture of the
structure of the Finnish-Soviet trade (import/export) in the 1970s and the simul-
taneous intensification of the STC.²¹ Finnish exports to the Soviet Union took a
remarkable leap in the mid-1970s. This was due to the worldwide oil crisis in the
early 1970s that prompted almost inexhaustible Soviet demand for Finnish
goods: the higher the oil price, the greater the export possibilities for Finland.²²
The value of Finland’s exports to the Soviet Union almost doubled from 1974 to
1975.²³ The share of exports from Finland to the Soviet Union was 13.8% in 1971–
1975 but in 1976 the exports were 20.2% in one year. Due to the clearing trade,
import from the Soviet Union increased correspondingly: in 1971– 1975 import
was 14.7% but in 1976 the share was 18.5%. In 1978, the Soviet Union was the
biggest trade partner of Finland and Finland was the third biggest trade partner
of the Soviet Union.²⁴ Finnish-Soviet trade was at its highest in the first part of
the 1980s. In 1982– 1983, the share was over 25%,which was the peak year of the
trade. For a short period of time, Finland was the most important trading partner
for the Soviet Union.²⁵ Finnish-Soviet bilateral trade is a good example of “the
commerce between countries with different economic and social systems” and
thus Finnish-Soviet trade resonates well with the aims of the TRADESOC section
in UNCTAD analyzed by Michel Christian in this volume. If not the most tradi-
tional one, there were several elements in the trade that were advocated in
the Finnish-Soviet trade. At the same time, however, the Finnish-Soviet trade
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 18–21, 60–62, 100– 103.
 Pekka Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union. The Finnish Experience 1944– 1991 (Helsinki: Ki-
kimora Publications Series B 39, 2014), 42.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 44–45. This also worked the other way round: when
the oil price was low, Finland benefitted in terms of income, but had to accommodate decline
in exports to the Soviet Union.
 “Value of Finnish imports and exports by country 1856–1975” (Table 5.14.) in Suomen ta-
loushistoria. Historiallinen tilasto, osa 3 [Economic History of Finland. Historical Statistics,
part 3], ed. Kaarina Vattula (Helsinki: kustannusosaekyhtiö Tammi, 1983), 240; One explanation
for the increase of exports was the oil crisis during which upward oil prices increased Finnish
exports to the Soviet Union due to the bilateral balancing of Finnish-Soviet trade. Sutela, Trad-
ing with the Soviet Union, 64.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Raportti Suomen ja
Neuvostoiiton välisen yhteistyön metodologiaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta. Osat 1–2 [Finland-SSSR:
Scientific-technical and economic interaction. Report on the methodological study of the Soviet-
Finnish cooperation. Part 1–2] (Helsinki: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välisen tieteellis-teknisen
yhteistoimintakomitean julkaisusarja 7, 1980), 15– 16.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 49, 64. On a per capita basis.
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is a good example of the Soviet Union willingness to focus solely on bilateral
trade.²⁶
It is possible to see the interconnectedness of the Finnish-Soviet trade and
the STC in the development of trade and the organization of the STC. The perma-
nent Soviet-Finnish commission on economic cooperation based on the model of
the STC was established in 1967 to support the development of the trade. Two
years later the scientific cooperation was strengthened by establishing disci-
pline-based working groups under the structure of the STC. In 1971, the treaty
to develop economic, technological, and industrial collaboration between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union was signed. In 1974 and 1975, long-term programs
to increase economic and industrial collaboration between the two states were
approved. In 1977 a long-term program was signed to deepen and develop the
economy and trade in the field of industrial and scientific-technical cooperation
between Finland and the Soviet Union until 1990. From the 1970s, the main aim
of the joint programs was to increase technology transfers and especially tech-
nology trade between the two states.²⁷
The Finnish mixed economy system enabled planning and state regulation
that maintained the strong connection between the trade and STC. Many of
the large conglomerates participating in the Finnish-Soviet trade and the STC
were owned by the state, which made the regulation and planning even easier.
In addition, actors in the trade and the STC were the same: intergovernmental
working groups, trade delegations, Finnish enterprises, and the Soviet foreign
trade organizations.²⁸ The five-year agreements and secured payments made
the Finnish-Soviet trade attractive for Finnish enterprises. The trade possibilities
in the Soviet Union and the whole socialist bloc offered huge possibilities for
Finnish partners. Through the system of bilateral trade, Finnish enterprises
were able to export upgraded goods to the Soviet Union and in exchange Finland
was able to import oil and energy.²⁹ At the state level over-dependence on Soviet
trade and Soviet oil was seen as problematic. That is why Finland tried to trade
with the West and diminish its energy dependence on the Soviet Union by coop-
erating with Western oil suppliers. Still, the share of the trade was high and the
 Michel Christian, “It is not a question of rigidly planning trade” in this volume.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part I, 16– 17.
 Riitta Hjerppe, “Teollisuus” in Suomen taloushistoria. Teollistuva Suomi.Osa 2 [Economic his-
tory of Finland. Industrializing Finland, Part 2], ed. Jorma Ahvenainen, Erkki Pihkala, Viljo Ra-
sila (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi 1982), 412–413; Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing
Trade and Payment System, 61.
 Suomen ulkomaankauppatilasto 1971 [Export statistics of Finland 1971] (Helsinki 1972),
82–83.
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share of the Soviet oil was at least half of Finnish oil imports.³⁰ Due to the fact
that the clearing trade was based on a balanced flows of goods, it was difficult
for Finland to find marketable goods to import from the Soviet Union. During the
years of Finnish-Soviet trade, the imbalance of export/import was the major
problem, but as a whole the trade with the Soviet Union was beneficial for Fin-
land. The disadvantage of the clearing trade with the Soviet Union was that it
cast a shadow on Finland’s desired image in the West as a free, modern and de-
veloped Western market economy.³¹
Soviet STC and Finland –
focusing on practical cooperation
The commission of Soviet-Finnish scientific-technical cooperation was establish-
ed in 1955 as a state-level organization comprising of the Finnish ministry of for-
eign affairs, the Academy of Finland, and in the Soviet Union, the State commit-
tee of science and technology (GKNT) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The
early years of the cooperation mainly consisted of reciprocal visits to the basic
industrial production units that were possible to organize without overly compli-
cated official arrangements. Soviet experts visited Finnish production units
where the experts in komandirovka ‘assignment’ wrote reports about their obser-
vations,which were very practical, such as details related to the equipment used,
lighting, and the organization of work.³² This information was collected in order
to develop the organization of work at home and was based on interaction with
the experts; Soviet experts asked questions and hosts shared information with
their guests. During the late 1960s, when the technological development in Fin-
land was fast, the STC started to divide into two: scientific cooperation and tech-
nological cooperation. The scientific cooperation consisted of experts from Fin-
nish and Soviet universities, research institutes and ministries (in the Soviet
Union). Finnish and Soviet experts met and exchanged information during the
reciprocal visits, seminars, workshops, and conferences organized on the basis
of the STC. In the bilateral meetings current scientific issues were discussed
 Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma öljy, 257, 275.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 100– 103.
 A Soviet delegation visited the city of Tampere in August 1958 in local factories. Noted in the
report was, for example, the quality of machinery (mainly American and West German). Russian
State Archive of Scientific-Technical Documentation, branch in Samara (RGANTD) f. 18, op. 2–6,
d. 205, l.1– 12; Similar examples in West Germany, see RGANI, f. 5, op.40, d. 67, l. 1–2.
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(such as new trends and technologies). Scientists conducted joint research proj-
ects and wrote books together.³³
The technological cooperation consisted of the experts but also of Finnish
enterprises and the Soviet trade organizations. In the export-oriented Finnish
firms, it was understood that participation in the STC helped to widen economic
and industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union.³⁴ In the field of technology co-
operation, the system was closely connected to the Finnish-Soviet trade.³⁵ Tech-
nological knowhow had diversified in Finland because of the active collabora-
tion with the Western enterprises, of which the electronic industry and oil
refining industry were good examples.³⁶ These areas were also the primary inter-
est of the Soviet partners.When Finland’s connection and access to the Western
technology and knowhow increased, the Soviet partners’ interest in collabora-
tion with the Finnish enterprises increased too. From the late 1960s, the visits
of the Soviet partners were much better prepared than before. To enhance the
process, the GKNT organized the collection of in-advance information, which in-
creased Soviet specialists’ ability to adapt knowledge during their visits. Soviet
technology advisors in the Soviet embassies in respective countries collected
the information available in technology fairs, such as brochures and advertise-
ments, but also through specialized literature that was used to plan and specify
the target enterprises to visit.³⁷
 A good example is the Finnish-Soviet STC in the field of computer science. ARAN f. 579,
op. 13, d. 162, l. 72–73; Concerning the Soviet delegations visits, see: ARAN f. 579, op. 13, d.
162, l. 17–34. From Finnish side, see Selostus suomalais-neuvostoliittolaisesta symposiumista
13.5.1975 [Report from Soviet-Finnish symposium 13.5.1975)]. Commission of the Finnish-Soviet
scientific-technical cooperation: travelogues. Archive of foreign ministry of Finland (FMA).
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus, Part I, 11.
 In the case of Finland, see for example, Tieteellis-teknistä yhteistoimintaa varten Suomen ta-
savallan ja Sosialististen Neuvostotasavaltain liiton välille asetetun suomalais-neuvostoliittolais-
en komitean pöytäkirja 17.-25. 2.1956 Moskovassa pidetystä istunnosta (jäljennös) [Copy of the
protocol of establishment of the commission on scientific-technical cooperation between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union]. Commission of the Finnish-Soviet scientific-technical cooperation
(STC), Archive of Finnish foreign ministry (FMA).
 Martti Häikiö, Fuusio. Yhdistymisen kautta suomalaiseksi monialayritykseksi 1865– 1982 [His-
tory of the enterprise Nokia 1865– 1982, part 1] (Helsinki: Edita, 2001), 99; Kuisma, Kylmä sota,
kuuma öljy, 255.
 RGANI fond 5, opis’ 61, delo 55a, list 45–55. Soviet sovetniki, ‘technology advisors’ worked as
coordinators between the GKNT and foreign enterprises; Instruction of the use of foreign jour-
nals: RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 81–86. Collected information was administered
and translated into Russian by the All-Union Institute of Scientific-Technical Information, (Vse-
soyuznyi institut nauchnoi i tekhnicheskoi informatsii,VINITI). RGANI fond 5, opis’ 33, delo 46, list
15– 16, 21.VINITI was established in 1952. It collected and produced summaries from 22,000 sci-
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The Soviet specialists were assigned clear plans of action for their visits. On
the basis of the information collected in advance, the GKNT drew up a list of
questions about technological processes to be answered during the visit,
based on detailed knowledge of the production of the receiving enterprise.³⁸
After demand for the new technology increased remarkably in the Soviet
Union in the 1960s and 1970s, the cooperation started to focus on technology re-
lated-knowledge. It is possible to observe this phenomenon in the archival ma-
terials for instance when the Finnish partners brought to the discussions prob-
lems with the Soviet experts who were eager to get information about
technology that was forbidden by strict license and patent agreements.³⁹ The co-
operation became challenging for Finnish partners who did not want to risk
problems in their contacts with their Western partners.
By focusing on the practical cooperation, the Soviet Union was able to keep
the STC cooperation bilateral and use it in a way that served the needs of the
Soviet side without creating tensions in the superpower politics. A good example
of the target-oriented STC activity in the field of high technology was the estab-
lishment of the working group in cybernetics, later a working group on computer
technology. During Khrushchev’s leadership, cybernetics was given an important
entific journals and publication series, and about 8,000 books from 130 countries in 70 different
languages. It was re-organized under the jurisdiction of the GKNT and the Academy of Sciences.
Seppänen, Jouko, Tieteellis-tekninen informaatio Neuvostoliitossa [Scientific-technical informa-
tion in the Soviet Union] (Helsinki: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton tieteellis-teknisen yhteistoiminta-
komitean julkaisusarja 2, 1978).
 RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 57.
 Neste Oy:n vastaus TT-komission tiedusteluun 16.10.1961 [Reply from enterprise Neste to the
enquiry sent by the commission of scientific-technical cooperation]. 13/647–55, FMA. The letter
referred to the earlier experiences; In West Germany, the Soviet experts were accused of indus-
trial espionage and Soviet experts’ visits to the West German enterprises were suspended. RGAE
fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 138. Illegal trade and spying were organized in more effective
ways e.g., through military intelligence (GRU) and KGB. Additionally, dummy firms were estab-
lished in Europe to acquire desired technology. Report. Soviet acquisition of Western technology
(Library of Congress, 1. April 1982); Collection of information during the Cold War was easily
connected to technological espionage. In the STC spying was not – at least not openly– an ex-
pressed aim because the desired information was available freely; Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma
öljy, 276. Finnish oil refining enterprise Neste collaborated with American technology enterpris-
es; Although Finland was not a member of the CoCom embargo, enterprises were unwilling to
share knowhow that was in conflict with the CoCom lists; Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and
Neutrality:Western Export Control policies, Finland and the Cold War, 1949–58,” in Reassessing
Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),
49–65.
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role in technological modernization.⁴⁰ The position of cybernetics changed in the
mid-1960s when Leonid Brezhnev took over the leadership. In spite of the previ-
ous existence of Institutes of Cybernetics and efforts to develop Soviet computer
technology, the Soviet leadership made a decision to give up the development of
its own computer systems and to copy IBM 360⁴¹ technology in 1969. Coinciding
with the decision, the Soviet STC partner suggested the establishment of the
working group of cybernetics through the system of STC to Finnish counterparts.
The timing was impeccable because through the Finnish cooperation, Soviet ex-
perts gained access to the software that was needed to make the copied comput-
ers work.⁴² Computer technology remained one of the major interests in the STC
until the end of the Cold War.
The Cold War context created frameworks for the Soviet technology cooper-
ation with the Western partners. Furthermore, it explains the ways in which the
cooperation was motivated and organized. The Soviet-Finnish STC was based on
individual projects, which helped to keep the cooperation bilateral and motivat-
ed on both sides. The Soviet partners were willing to strengthen the state-level
cooperation and trade that would have supplied the economic, technological,
and scientific demand in the Soviet Union. As a capitalist country, Finland
was motivated by economic profit, marketing possibilities, and possibility to en-
hance domestic R&D. For the Finnish STC partners, especially export-oriented
enterprises, the main motivator was direct contact with the Soviet partners.
 A good example of this was the establishment of the Tallinn Institute of Cybernetics, which
was part of Tallinn University of technology. Sampsa Kaataja, “Expert Groups Closing the Divide:
Estonian-Finnish Computing Cooperation Since the 1960s,” in Beyond the Divide. Entangled His-
tories of Cold War Europe, ed. Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (Oxford: Berghahn books 2015),
103. According to Kaataja, Tallinn Institute of Cybernetics did not participate in fully classified
projects but was a category B institution. There is an increasing number of studies focusing on
Soviet cybernetics, see for example Slava Gerovitch, From Cyberspeak to Newspeak. A History of
Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); An important contribution to the field of
cybernetics but also technology transfers is Egle Rindzeviciute, The Power of Systems. How Policy
Sciences Opened up to the Cold War World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2016).
 About IBM in Finland, see Petri Paju and Thomas Haigh, “IBM rebuilds Europe. The curious
case of the transnational typewriter,” Enterprise & Society 2(2015); Petri Paju, “Monikansallinen
yritys ja siteet länteen. IBM Suomessa ja Länsi-Euroopassa 1940-luvun lopulla ja 1950-luvulla”
[A multinational corporation and ties to the West: IBM in Finland and in Western Europe during
the post-war years and the 1950s], Historiallinen aikakauskirja 3 (2015).
 Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain,” 72; For a discussion about the ben-
efits of the cooperation, see ARAN, fond 579, opis’ 13, delo 162, list 72–73. Other contributions in
this volume thematize the East-West dimension of the computerization process – i.e. Sandrine
Kott, “The social engineering project” and Ondřej Matějka, “Social engineering and alienation
between East and West.”
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When they had direct contacts, firms were able to collaborate outside the official
STC organs.⁴³ The Finnish enterprises were able to negotiate directly with their
Soviet partners and agree, for example, on the prices.⁴⁴ The “technological
turn” in the STC and the Soviet-Finnish trade took place in the 1970s when the
technological level had markedly increased in Finland.
Finland as a mediator of Western technology
to the Soviet Union
The Finnish enterprises in Soviet trade were mainly large conglomerates. The five
largest accounted for almost 40% of all exports from Finland to the Soviet Union
because of the clearing trade system. Due to the long-term contracts, the private-
ly owned profit-maximizing enterprises actively participated in the trade.⁴⁵ Fin-
nish exporters were able to use the Soviet markets’ springboard to the Western
markets because Finland was able to develop and produce exports for which
there was no demand in Finland. Long-term contracts and trade agreements
and secured payments increased security in Finland and Finnish exporters
were protected from external competition.⁴⁶ In the 1970s, when it was difficult
to get into the Western market, the Soviet Union offered several trading possibil-
ities and strict payments. Among especially successful enterprises were con-
glomerates that could offer a large assortment of products to supply Soviet de-
mand.
A good example of an enterprise like this was Nokia, a conglomerate that
became a member of the Soviet-Finnish STC in 1957. Nokia’s cooperation and
trade with the Soviet Union illustrates the development of the STC from the
1950s until 1991. During the Cold War era, Nokia had two major export lines
to the Soviet Union: cables and communication devices.⁴⁷ Although Nokia be-
came well known for communication devices, especially mobile phones in the
 These organs were the STC Commission and Economic Commission in Finland and in the
Soviet Union Ministry of foreign trade, State Committee of Foreign Trade (GKES), ministries,
and commercial missions of the Soviet Union in Finland. Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja ta-
loudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part I, 40–43.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 60–62.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 65–66.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 100– 103.
 Martti Häikiö, Sturm und Drang. Suurkaupoilla eurooppalaiseksi elektroniikkayritykseksi
1983– 1991. Nokia Oyj:n historia. osa 2 [History of enterprise Nokia 1983– 1991, part 2] (Edita: Hel-
sinki, 2001), 195.
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1990s, it was cable production that created the cornerstone for Nokia’s beneficial
trade with the Soviet Union. Soviet industry was not able to produce enough ca-
bles to meet the increasing demand, which opened large and widening trade
possibilities for Nokia with the Soviet Union. Nokia had to follow the export
quota defined in the state-level trade protocols for the exchange of goods, but
being a privately-owned, profit-maximizing enterprise, Nokia’s main aim was
to make the export quotas as high as possible in order to gain maximum benefit
from the trade with the Soviet Union.
In 1971 a protocol of exchange of goods was signed. It included the export of
high technology cables. This profitable deal was important for enhancing the
R&D and furthering other units at the Nokia conglomerate. The mid-1970s repre-
sented an especially beneficial time after the oil crisis when the Soviet Union
wanted to import more cables than Nokia was able to produce. As a conglomer-
ate, Nokia could exploit the positive turnover in the other units. One of the rea-
sons for the possibility to develop R&D in Finland was the system of bilateral
trade, which included the pre-pay system. When the product was partly paid
in advance, it gave Finnish partners the advantage of developing their products,
especially technology which was not only for the Soviet trade but targeted at
Western markets as well. Thus, the Soviet trade was a useful stepping stone
for new and expanding firms such as Nokia, but it also secured markets for
other Finnish enterprises.⁴⁸
Nokia Electronics started in the 1960s and developed on the basis of the So-
viet trade. For Nokia – as well as other Finnish enterprises – connections to tech-
nologically-advanced Western countries were extremely important. The Finnish
firms sent personnel to work in the electronic firms in the United States in
order to learn to use the newest technologies in this sphere. Nokia bought elec-
tronic devices from West Germany (Siemens) and delivered the provided technol-
ogy to Finland. The share of electronics in Nokia’s exports was 40%, of which
30% was directed to the Soviet Union and COMECON countries and 10% to
the West. In the 1970s, computer technology and computer systems became
part of Nokia’s portfolio and Finnish banks ordered computers and computer
systems from Nokia.⁴⁹ Simultaneously the interest of the Soviet partners started
to focus on these systems and STC visits focused on enterprises using these tech-
nologies.⁵⁰ These visits were partly connected to the work of the STC working
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 67, 73.
 Häikiö, Fuusio, 93, 156, 161,164.
 ARAN fond 579 opis’ 13, delo 162, list. 17–34; Neuvostoliittolaisen delegaation Suomen vier-
ailu. TT-komitea: saapuneet kirjeet [Soviet delegation in Finland, letters]. 1/1–30/6–71 FMA; Se-
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group of cybernetics. The cooperation bore fruit decades later when Nokia deliv-
ered digital phone exchanges to the whole Soviet communication system.⁵¹ The
Soviet Union clearly played a crucial role in the development of Nokia Electron-
ics.
Personal contacts and mutual trust were essential in the cooperation with
the Soviet Union. These factors were especially important in the technology
trade. That is why the role the commission of STC was fundamental when build-
ing contacts between Finnish enterprises and Soviet partners. In the 1980s when
the Nokia’s trade with the Soviet Union was at its highest, Nokia’s CEO was a
member of the Soviet-Finnish Commission on STC. Because of the bureaucratic
and slow Soviet system, personal contacts were demanded at every level to en-
hance the collaboration. Trust was earned through the long partnership and
good reputation but in Nokia’s case the physical presence of its representatives
in the Soviet Union proved to be very beneficial for trade. Nokia opened an office
in Moscow in order to organize exhibitions and to facilitate negotiations with So-
viet partners.⁵² When the Cold War cooled down, personal contacts became even
more important. Individual approaches and personal connections were used
whenever it was needed to bypass the official and politically embedded macro
(state) level politics.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CoCom restrictions were
tightened remarkably. Although not a member of the CoCom embargo, Finland
followed the strict trade restrictions.⁵³ Nokia had to adjust to Finland’s economic
policy and to take into account the changing situation. Finnish electronic indus-
try needed American components and thus could not ignore the US geopolitics.
Especially in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Finnish STC with the Soviet Union was
viewed by the United States as suspicious and problematic.⁵⁴ The concern and
suspicion in the United States was certainly partly justified, because besides
the trade with the Soviet Union Nokia also delivered technology to the Finnish
army. This became alarming in the 1980s when the CoCom embargo was signifi-
lostus suomalais-neuvostoliittilaisesta symposiumista 13.5.1975. TT-komitea: matkakertomuksia
[Report from the Finnish-Soviet symposium. ST commission, travelogues] 1956–1978. FMA.
 Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 54–55.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 2014, 88; Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 47–48, 50, 53;
Häikiö, Fuusio, 120, 157– 158, 182. Nokia’s CEO Kari Kairamo was an important figure in Finnish
trade in the 1980s.
 Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and Neutrality,” 58–61.
 Report: Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology April 1 1982 (Library of Congress). The report
did not mention Nokia or Finland but similar activities were defined as “suspicious.”
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cantly tightened.⁵⁵ In order to get American components, Nokia had to get appro-
val from the United States to continue trade with the Soviet Union. The solution
was that Nokia’s CEO made a personal agreement with the Pentagon to provide
them with information about technological progress in the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ The
fact that Finnish enterprises were always technologically one step ahead of
the Soviet Union, kept the cooperation on track. In the late 1980s, Finland con-
cluded a secret, state-level agreement with the United States about how to con-
tinue trade in the both directions.⁵⁷ By this time, however, Soviet-Finnish trade
was reaching its final stage.
It is possible to argue that Nokia was able to continue trade with the Soviet
Union under surveillance because the technology traded to the Soviet Union did
not threaten the military strategic equilibrium. Nevertheless, the other branch of
advanced technology in Finland, the ship building industry and especially the
construction of icebreakers, was followed more closely during the Cold War.⁵⁸
A good example of the Cold War restrictions directly influencing Finland is con-
nected to the case of Finnish mini-submarines in the 1980s. The Soviet Academy
of Sciences ordered two deep-sea mini-submarines able to dive down to six kilo-
metres from the Finnish conglomerate Rauma-Repola. At the beginning, the proj-
ect was not objected to by Finland’s Western allies, because they believed that
Finland was not able to master the advanced technology needed for the project.
Still the project was closely followed by the United States. After finishing the
order successfully, the United States started to pressure the shipyard Rauma-Re-
pola Oceanics by threatening the mother company Rauma-Repola with bank-
 Full technological information was delivered only after the next generation device was cre-
ated. Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 126– 127.
 Interviews with Former Deputy Minister of Defence Richard Perle in the documentary film
“Kauppasotaa pinnan alla” [Trade war under water]. Presented by Channel One YLE on Finnish
Television 7 December 2008. Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Bush Administration in the
US, Richard Perle was in charge of the negotiations with Nokia. The existence of the agreement
was confirmed by Stefan Widomski, former Senior Vice President International Trade Affairs in
Nokia corp. Discussion with Widomski in Helsinki in 21 May 2014.
 Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain,” 74. Clearing trade between Finland
and the Soviet Union/Russia ended in 1991.
 For the political dimension and techno-politics of the Soviet-Finnish icebreaker trade, see
Saara Matala, “Flashy flagships of Cold War cooperation – The Finnish-Soviet nuclear icebreak-
er project,” Technology & Culture, 4/2018 forthcoming. Saara Matala, “The Business of Foreign
Affairs. Unrealized visions of joint business, technology and politics in Finnish -Soviet ship-
building at the end of the Cold War”. (Paper presented in the ICOHTEC International Committee
for the History of Technology) in Proceedings of the 41th ICOHTEC Symposium 2014 Technology in
times of transition, ed. Helerea, E., Cionca, M, Ivãnoiu, M (Brasov: Transylvania University of Bra-
sov, 2014), 65–70.
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ruptcy. In the end, two ready-made vessels were delivered to the Soviet Union but
Rauma-Repola was forced to abandon Oceanics and the whole branch of the
deep-sea industry.⁵⁹
Transferred technology in the
centrally planned economy
The main aim of the Soviet economic modernization project was the dissemina-
tion of the transferred technology and related knowledge into the Soviet R&D
and industry to boost domestic innovations and thus facilitate the moderniza-
tion of the Soviet (civilian) industry. Dissemination of the transferred technology
and knowledge was essential for the process of diffusion,⁶⁰ the next phase of the
modernization process that would have created a strong basis for the use of new
applications and the emergence of domestic innovations. This process was ex-
pected to change the technological basis of the Soviet economy and to transform
its extensive economic growth into an intensive one. From the perspective of So-
viet leaders, the intensification would have increased the resilience of the USSR
economy, and domestic innovations would have enabled the independent devel-
opment of the Soviet industry and so lead to modernization.⁶¹
In the 1960s and 1970s, the main organ in the dissemination of the transfer-
red technology and knowledge was the State Committee of Science and Technol-
ogy (GKNT). It was in charge of new technologies and methods of developing sci-
ence and technology in the Soviet Union. Thus the GKNT also coordinated the
transfers channelled through the STC.⁶² The process of dissemination and imple-
mentation of the transferred technologies had been evaluated in the mid-1950s.
Due to its poor outcomes, the whole system was reorganized in the late 1950s in
order to improve the process. One of the major changes was that GKNT’s role in
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 93.
 Diffusion is the process by which new technology and related knowledge is transferred
through certain channels among the members of social system. Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of
Innovations, Third Edition (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1983). Rogers refers also to
the transfer of knowledge and technology.
 Intensification, growth and innovation have been the main concepts in the Soviet and Rus-
sian modernization discussion. For an overview of the modernization discussion, see Joachim
Zweynert and Ivan Boldyrev, “Conflicting patterns of thought in the Russian debate on modern-
isation and innovation 2008–2013,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, No. 6 (2017), 921–939.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part II, 37, 163; Rog-
ers, Diffusion of Innovations, 335.
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the dissemination of the collected information to the Soviet R&D and industry
were clarified and strengthened. In order to make the process more effective,
the GKNT was given authority to sign international contracts with foreign enter-
prises and organizations.⁶³ In addition, the GKNT was subordinated more clearly
to the centralized planning system.
The Soviet planning system was seen as a booster for the dissemination
process by determining how much and where the resources (including transfers)
were to be allocated and how the allocations were controlled.⁶⁴ In spite of the
obvious advantages of the planning system in resource allocation and mis-
sion-oriented projects, the main problem was that the innovation emphases
and plan fulfilment were almost always in conflict. A major innovation often re-
quired several years before it began to operate successfully. The planning hori-
zon in the Soviet Union was short and did not enable experimentation that
would last several years. Any new technology also required considerable new re-
sources and new suppliers, which represented a fundamental problem because
of the lack of horizontal connections⁶⁵ between industries in the USSR. All
branches of civilian industry needed to compete for the same materials, which
resulted in departmental barriers being set up. The prices of new products
were often set at a level that provided a lower rate of profit and counted for
less towards plan fulfilment than the older, standard products. Hence, if plan
fulfilment was threatened, the tendency was to shift away from new products to-
ward the safe, old ones. There was a great gap between Soviet scientific and en-
gineering achievements and the capacity to transform them into economically
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part II, 165; A good
example of this kind of contract was the one signed with West German enterprise Siemens in
1971. RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 9, delo 2509 A, list 18–26 L; See also RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7,
delo 816, list 57.
 Joseph Berliner, Soviet industry from Stalin to Gorbachev. Essays on management and innova-
tions (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 225; E.P. Hoffman & R.F. Laird, “The scientific-technolog-
ical revolution” and Soviet foreign policy (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 82. Scientific research
work was connected to the planning system in the ‘thirties and ‘forties. Loren Graham, Science in
Russia and the Soviet Union. A short History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 181;
See also Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917– 1991 (London: Penguin books, 1992),
350.
 In the cases where horizontal connections were created, the outcome of the process was also
more successful. A good example is the case of the Kirov kolkhoze in Estonia. Antti Sarasmo,
“The Kirov Fishing kolkhoz. A Socialist Success Story” in Competition in Socialist society, ed. Ka-
talin Miklóssy and Melanie Ilic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 53–70.
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competitive innovations.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, it was the same centralized control that
enabled impressive mission-oriented projects, such as the Soviet space program,
yet blocked innovation in many other fields.⁶⁷
It was paradoxical that the process of transfer was very functional and in-
cluded tools that could have enhanced the dissemination and diffusion of new
technologies. One of the tools was the system of organizing expert visits through
the STC. These visits were not only channels for communication between Finnish
and Soviet experts, but also a way to obtain the knowledge necessary for the suc-
cessful diffusion process. During their visits, based on their own expertize, spe-
cialists collected different kinds of knowledge about the technology, but also
about how to use it. After their visits, they wrote reports based on their observa-
tions and returned the questionnaires they were expected to fill during their vis-
its to the GKNT. The GKNT was expected to deliver the information to the Soviet
R&D and industry in order to develop further transfers and diffusion of the tech-
nologies and related knowledge. Practical information that was collected and re-
ported by the specialists in their travel reports would have been easy to adopt in
everyday work. However, the adaptation at the shop-floor level proved to be
poor. The futility of the personal contributions to the process and the inability
of individuals to utilize the imported models in their own work created an atmos-
phere of deep discontent among Soviet specialists. This brought the aspect of un-
intended consequence to the transfer process.⁶⁸
There are various explanations for the problems in dissemination, imple-
mentation, and diffusion of the transferred technology and related knowledge.
The dissemination might have taken place but the diffusion was not realized
and in many cases the transferred technology was implemented into use as
such. This was especially the case when there was an urgent demand for certain
technology. It was easier to start production by directly using the technology
rather than to launch time-consuming experiments based on the new technology
in order to enhance domestic innovations. Furthermore, there were departmental
barriers created by the system of a planned economy but also institutional and
personal barriers that hindered the process of diffusion and also implementa-
tion.
Such barriers were visible for instance in the Soviet forest industry that was
one of the many modernization projects in the Soviet Union carried out during
 Hoffman & Laird, The Scientific-Technological Revolution, 98; Berliner, Soviet industry from
Stalin to Gorbachev 203, 218.
 Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, 201.
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Technological Modernisation in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Rus-
sia: Practices and Continuities,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no.1 (2016): 79–96.
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the Khrushchev leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. In the forest industry trans-
ferred technology filled technological gaps and helped the branch to be more
competitive. At the same time there were clear failures in implementing transfer-
red technologies and supporting innovations either based on the transferred
technologies or genuine domestic innovations.⁶⁹
The case of continuous pulp cooking⁷⁰ provides a good example in which
different techniques had been innovated in the West but also in the Soviet
Union. This genuine Soviet innovation did not succeed and the Western technol-
ogy was implemented in the Soviet pulp mills. The Soviet pulp mills are a good
example of the role of Finland as a mediator of the new technology. A major part
of the most advanced pulp mills in the Soviet Union were originally Finnish but
became Soviet when the Karelian Isthmus was annexed to the Soviet Union after
World War Two. The original Finnish technology was used in the mills until the
demand for more modern technology emerged. In the beginning, the Soviet in-
novation was introduced to the pulp cooking but due to severe problems in im-
plementation, the home technology was replaced by foreign technology. Fin-
land, again, had an important role in the mediation of the new technology
and related knowledge. The Soviet forest industry specialists visited Finland
through the STC and collected information. The existing knowledge and the im-
plementation of the new technology did not solve the problem of the low quality
pulp. The main reasons for the poor outcome were the quality of the raw materi-
al, problems in maintaining technology, the lack of spare parts, and horizontal
connections and problems in sharing information. The system did not support
providing enough resources for complicated technology.⁷¹
Similar problems emerged in other complicated systems of technology. In
the 1980s, Nokia participated in the Finnish-Soviet protocol of an exchange of
goods channelled through the STC with the project of the automatic phone ex-
change system DX 200. The DX 200 project was Nokia’s production collaboration
with the Soviet partner, that is, cooperation on an enterprise-production unit
level. In the project, there was a conflict between the expectations and practical
cooperation from the Soviet side. The Soviet partners seemed to be interested in
 Elena Kochetkova, “The Soviet Forestry Industry in the 1950s and 1960s: A Project of Mod-
ernization and Technology Transfer from Finland,” Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences
52 (2017).
 The pulp cooking is an interesting case because it had a dual meaning. Pulp was also need-
ed in the military industry (especially in the production of ammunition) that explains the re-
source allocations to the field.
 Elena Kochetkova, “A history of failed innovation: continuous cooking and the Soviet pulp
industry, 1940s-1960s,” History and Technology 31, no. 2 (2015), 108–132.
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the long-term collaboration in order to “learn-by-doing.” But even though the
system was based solely on planning in Nokia (Finland) and all the components
came from the West (from the US, Japan or Germany) the Soviet partners were
not able to benefit from the collaboration as expected. The Soviet partners com-
plained that Nokia had not sent the necessary information to them and thus they
had not been able to “sovietize” the production, that is, to produce equipment
and components in the Soviet Union. Nokia replied to the accusations saying
that all technical information was shared with the Soviet partners well in ad-
vance. The reply brought to the fore the fact that the problem was at the techno-
logical level of the Soviet partners and not in the actions of Nokia. In spite of the
occasional problems, Nokia continued its projects of production collaboration
with the Soviet Union. Among others, Nokia exported communication systems,
robotics, and computer technology to the USSR.⁷²
Conclusion
The Soviet system of the scientific-technical cooperation created an active net-
work of bilateral connections between the Soviet Union and the Western Europe-
an states. The Soviet-Finnish STC is a good example of how “behind the scene”
East-West cooperation developed during the decades of Cold War division.When
the Soviet-Finnish STC began in the mid-1950s the contacts were relatively mod-
est and consisted mainly of reciprocal visits and the transfer of basic informa-
tion. During the 1970s and 1980s, the cooperation started to focus on high tech-
nology and joint projects between Finnish and Soviet partners. The Soviet-
Finnish STC was specific because it was connected and supported by the Fin-
nish-Soviet clearing trade, regulated by the state and based on planning. For Fin-
land, the role as mediator of Western technology and its cooperation with the So-
viet Union proved to be beneficial. The Finnish export-oriented enterprises
learned quickly to cooperate with the Soviet Union and to adjust their supply
to the demand of the Soviet partners. With long trade agreements and secured
payments from the Soviet trade, Finnish enterprises were able to focus on
R&D and develop their products for the Western markets as well. Finland learned
to “play” the Cold War and to balance trade with Soviet Union according to its
own goals to increase Western trade. Thanks to this capacity Finland was able
to diversify its economy and to transform into a technologically-oriented, mod-
ern state during the Cold War decades.
 Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 56–57, 196– 198, 254.
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On the other side, from the point of view of modernization, economic diver-
sification or domestic innovations, the outcome did not meet the aims of the So-
viet Union. The main aim of the Soviet STC and its trade with Finland, i.e. the
transfer of technology and related knowledge to boost domestic innovations
and to enhance economic modernization, was not fully realized. The practical
transfers through the bilateral STC proved to be very effective. Technologies
and related knowledge were transferred to the Soviet Union through the STC ac-
cording to the plan created by the GKNT. However, the dissemination, implemen-
tation and especially the diffusion of transferred knowledge to the Soviet R&D
and industry proved to be difficult. Transfers, including new production models,
technology and related knowledge, were processed in the system of GKNT, but
the dissemination to the production level was not realized as planned. Technol-
ogies were not adapted at the shop-floor level as expected and the Soviet R&D
was not able to boost domestic innovations. The system of the Soviet planned
economy favored the fulfilment of the plan and the lack of horizontal connec-
tions created barriers that hindered the introduction of new technologies and
technological experiments.
Technology transfers during the Cold War substantially influenced the inno-
vation policy in the Soviet Union with obvious consequences for contemporary
Russia. The Soviet Union acquired new technology from abroad and paid for
the transfers with raw materials and energy. This created a basis for the one-
sided, raw material-based economy that has proved to be one of the major ob-
stacles for economic development in contemporary Russia. Current discussions
about the economic modernization of Russia follow the same discursive patterns
today as they did in the 1970s. The road towards the diversification of the econ-
omy presupposes competitive domestic innovations and intensive economic
growth that would enhance resilience in the economy which in the Soviet-Rus-
sian case has remained an elusive objective.
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